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M. TAXATION
Of the several tax cases before the Supreme Court in 1963, four
dealt with the problem of distinguishing capital gain and income. In
each case the court decided in favour of the contention of the Minister
of National Revenue that the increase in assets was taxable income.
The first of these cases was James Frederick Scott v. M.N.R.1 The
appellant Scott, a lawyer, purchased agreements for sale of land and
mortgages on land, acquiring about 150 such securities over a number
of years. He bought them at discounts ranging from 20% to 40%
and held them till maturity. Most of the securities were considered
risky and not normally handled by mortgage institutions. The appel-
lant's funds for these purchases were his own savings and a bank
loan. The Supreme Court affirming the Exchequer Court held that
the discounts were taxable income rather than accretions to capital.
Although the appellant was not in the business of lending money or
dealing in real estate agreements, he was in the speculative business
of buying agreements at a discount and holding them to maturity to
realize the maximum profits; also the transactions involved a grave
element of risk, hence the gain was considered income.
Judson J. discussed the recent line of "income v. capital" tax
cases that had been heard in the Exchequer Court. Those which the
Scott case followed including M.N.. v. Spencer2 and M.N.R. v. Min-
den.3 Cohen v. M.N.R. 4 and M.N.R. v. Maclnnes5 were distinguished.
The MacInnes decision (reversed by the Supreme Court later in 1963)
stated that the Cohen, Spencer, Scott (at the Exchequer Court level)
and Minden cases were each decided on their facts. The Spencer deci-
sion limited the Cohen case to its facts; Thorson P. saying that unless
the facts are identical, the Cohen decision should not be considered of
general application, and suggesting by implication that the Cohen
case might have been wrongly decided.
Commenting on this line of cases, Judson J. said:
The diversity of opinion is understandable when the decision must de-
pend on a full review of the facts in each case for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the discounts can be classified as income from a business.
Even on the same facts there is room for disagreement among judges on
the conclusions that should be drawn from the activities of a taxpayer,
for the Act nowhere specifically deals with these discounts.6
M.N.R. v. William Hadley Macnnes7 was heard in the Supreme
Court later in the year. It stressed the Court's position of basing its
decision mainly on the particular facts of each case, and strengthened
the position of the Minister in assessing investment gains as taxable.
1 [1963] S.C.R. 223.
2 [1961) C.T.C. 109.
3 [1962] C.T.C. 79.4 [1957] C.T.C. 251.
5 [1962] C.T.C. 350.
6 Supra, footnote 1 at p. 225.
7 [1963] S.C.R. 299.
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MacInnes the respondent was a soap manufacturer who had acquired
over '300 mortgages at discounts from real estate agents over a ten
year period. During that time the respondent realized discounts on
113 of the mortgages, and the Minister assessed these discounts as
income. They amounted to about one-fifth of the aggregate principal.
The mortgages were considered substandard and risky because they
represented about two-thirds of the value of the property rather than
the 45 % maximum stipulated by mortgage institutions.
The Exchequer Court had ruled that the discounts were not
profits and not taxable, as they resulted from investment rather than
from business or trade. Thorson P. pointed out that the intention to
make a profit is consistent with investment apart from a trade. The
large number of transactions merely showed a large amount of money
to invest. The investments were not really very risky as the respond-
ent did not foreclose any mortgages. The case Argue v. M.N.B., s
heard in the Supreme Court in 1948, was cited and followed.
The Supreme Court reversed this decision and held that the dis-
counts were taxable profits. The Court found that the respondent was
in a highly speculative business of buying risky mortgages and hold-
ing them to maturity to realize the maximum profit. Hence the dis-
counts were income from business and taxable under s. 3 of the
Income Tax Act. The Court followed the Scott case and distinguished
the Argue case, Judson J. saying:
We are of the opinion that Argue v. M.N.R. is in no way relevant to the
issues raised in the present appeal. The problem in Argue was whether
interest earned on long term real estate mortgages and agreements could
be regarded as income derived from the carrying on of a money-lending
business for the purposes of the Excess Profits Tax Act 1940. No evidence
would justify the finding that Argue was carrying on business as a money-
lender.9
It is of interest to examine the Argue case, as it appears to be
irreconcilable with the Scott and Maclnnes decisions. Argue, the
appellant, got revenue from mortgages and small loans as well as
from managing a real estate company. The Minister assessed him
under the Excess Profits Tax Act s. 2(1) (g) on the ground that the
income from the mortgages was part of the income derived from
carrying on a business. Section 2(1) (g) provides as follows:
2(1).-In this Act and in any regulations made under this Act, unless the
context otherwise requires, the expression,
(g) "profits" in the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation or joint
stock company, for any taxation period, means the income of the said
taxpayer derived from carrying on one or more businesses, as defined
by section 3 of the Income War Tax Act, and before any deductions are
made therefrom under any other provisions of the Income War Tax Act.
8 [19482 S.C.R. 467.
9 Bupra, footnote 7 at p. 304.
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The Income War Tax Act, s. 3 provides:
3.-"Income" means the annual net profits or gain or gratuity, whether
.. wages ... or fees ... or as being profits from a trade or commercial
or financial or other business or calling,... or from any business.... ;
and shall include the interest, dividends or profits directly or indirectly
received from money at interest upon any security or without security, or
from stocks, or from any other investment, and whether such gains or
profits are divided or distributed or not, and also the annual profit or
gain from any other source....
Argue had over $100,000 invested in first mortgages. The Supreme
Court held that the income was not taxable. Locke J. said, "I find
nothing in the evidence that the appellant carried on business as a
money-lender or that he was trading in securities or buying and sell-
ing them with a view to profit 10 and pointed out that no tax can
be imposed on a subject under a statute without words clearly showing
that Parliament intended to lay the burden on him.
The taxing provisions in the above statutes appear to be very
broad, and would seem wider in application than the corresponding
provisions in the present Income Tax Act which are as follows:
S. 3.-The income of a taxpayer for a taxation year for the purpose of
this Part is his income for the year from all sources inside or outside
Canada and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes
income for the year from all
(a) business,
(b) property, and
(c) offices and employments
S. 4.-Subject to the other provisions of this Part, income for a taxation
year from a business or property is the profit thereupon for the year.
Judson J. gave the judgments in both the Scott and MacInnes
cases, hence in the latter he merely adopted his own reasoning in the
former case. The Argue case was not mentioned in the Scott decision,
which relied on Exchequer Court decisions. Hence the Scott case ap-
pears to create a change in the law at least at the Supreme Court
level. By relying on the proposition that the issue is mainly a question
of facts, the Court avoided the problem of reconciling the decisions
with the precedents. In several of the line of Exchequer Court cases
referred to in the Scott case, the statement of the Lord President
Clerk (Macdonald) in Californian Copper Syndicate (Ltd. and Re-
duced) v. Harris:" "What is the line which separates the two classes
of cases (realization of ordinary investments and carrying on of busi-
ness) may be difficult to define, and each case must be considered
according to its facts. The question to be determined being-is the
sum of gain that has been made a mere enhancement of value by
10 [1948] S.C.R. 477.
11 (1904) 6 F. 894.
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realizing a security, or is it a gain made in an operation of business
in carrying out a scheme for profit-making?"'12 was adopted. Hence
the solution of making fact distinctions has become the standard in
tax cases.
The other two cases dealing with capital gain and income are
more straight-forward and less difficult to rationalize. In Osler, Ham-
mond & Nanton Ltd. v. M.N.R. 13 the appellant company was an invest-
ment dealer that bought a large block of common and preferred shares
in Trans-Canada Pipelines. The appellant sold most of these shares
but kept a few as an investment. Two years later the appellant got
the right to more of the pipeline shares, which it sold at a profit. The
appellant later made a further profit by selling the shares it had kept
in the first lot. The Supreme Court held that the appellant had ob-
tained the shares not as an investment but in the course of its busi-
ness as underwriters. The profits were made from the business hence
were taxable. Even if some of the shares were a commission from
Trans-Canada Pipelines, they were still part of the appellant's stock
in trade hence the profits on them were taxable.
In Hill-Clark-Francis Ltd. v. M.N.R.14 the appellant company was
a general dealer in lumber. It bought all the shares of one of its sup-
pliers, which was in financial difficulty, intending to make the supplier
a subsidiary. The appellant had in previous years acquired two sup-
pliers and made them subsidiaries. But the appellant sold the shares
in this supplier immediately after it exercised its option to buy them,
for three times the purchase price. The Court held that the appellant's
exercise of its option and sale of the shares had a trading character-
istic rather than having the characteristics of acquiring and realizing
an asset. The profit was profit from business hence taxable.
Two of the tax cases involved definitions of words in the tax
legislation. In the case Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd. v. M.N.R. :5 the
appellant taxpayer alleged it had a permanent establishment in Que-
bec which would entitle it to deduct from federal taxes the tax it paid
to that province. The Company had its head office and plant from
which it filled orders in Ontario. The company had a sales represen-
tative in Quebec who was not authorized to make contracts and who
kept his own office to do company work. Section 411 of the Income
Tax Regulations defines "permanent establishment"
41(1).-For the purposes of this Part
(a) "permanent establishment" includes branches, mines, oilwells, farms,
timber, lands, factories, workshops, warehouses, offices, agencies, and
other fixed places of business;
12 Ibid.
13 [1963] S.C.R. 432.
14 [1963] S.C.R. 452.
15 [1963] S.C.R. 45.
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(b) where a corporation carries on business through an employee who
has general authority to contract for his employer or principal or
has a stock of merchandise from which he regularly fills orders which
he receives, the said agent or employee shall be deemed to operate a
permanent establishment of the corporation.
(2) The use of substantial machinery or equipment in a particular place
at any time in a taxation year shall constitute a permanent establish-
ment in that place for the year.
The Supreme Court held that the company did not have a per-
manent establishment in Quebec, as it had no fixed place of business
there. The representative's office was not a branch office or agency of
the company. The representative could not complete contracts or fill
orders, merely forwarded orders to the Ontario plant. The representa-
tive's equipment for demonstration purposes was not considered to be
"substantial." Hence the company's allegation failed.
In M.N.R. v. Hollinger North, Shore Exploration Co. Ltd.16 the
Income Tax Act s. 83(5) exemption for "income derived from the
operation of a mine" for 36 months after production commences was
at issue. The Minister assessed the royalties received by the company
from sub-leasing the mine. The Supreme Court held that this income
was income "derived" from a mining operation hence exempt under
s. 83(5). "Derived" is not limited to "received", it also includes
"arising" or "accruing." R.F.E.
N. TORTS
Ouelefte v. Johnson; Ouelette v. Tourigny, [1963] S.C.R. 96.
By its dismissal of the appeal in the recent case of Ouelette v.
Johnson,1 the Supreme Court of Canada has exhibited its sympathy
with the Ontario courts and their attempt to narrow the operation
of subsection 105(2) of The Highway Traffic Act.2 The facts of the
case were as follows: the appellant-defendant Ouelette and the two
plaintiffs, Johnson and Kennefic all worked at the Consolidated Deni-
16 [1963] S.C.R. 131.
1 [19631 S.C.R. 96. In point of fact, there were two cases before the bar
namely Lionel Ouelette v. John Johnson and Lionel Ouelette and Ferrier
Turcotte v. Gladys Tourigny and Terry Tourigny infants under the age of 21
years by their next friend Hazel Agnes Kennefic and the said Hazel Agnes
Kennefic.2 R.S.O., 1960, c. 172, s. 105: (i) The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for
loss or damage sustained by any person by reason of negligence in the opera-
tion of the motor vehicle on the highway unless the motor vehicle was with-
out the owner's consent in possession of some person other than the owner
or his chauffeur, and the driver of a motor vehicle not being the owner Is
liable to the same extent as the owner. (ii) Notwithstanding subsection 1, the
owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in business
of carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage
resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried in,
or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alighting from the motor vehicle.
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